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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah

THE BOARD OF EDrCATION, RICH
COl'XTY ~CHOOL DISTRICT,
Plaintiff,
-vs.-

No. 7810

EARL F. P~-\~SEY, CLERK_, BOARD OF
EDrCATION, RICH COUNTY
SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant.

BRIEF OF AMICUS CURIAE

STATE~fENT

OF FACTS

This is an original proceeding brought in this court
to compel the Clerk of the Board of Education of Rich
County School District to :-;ign certain bonds of that
school district. The action has been brought to obtain a
judicial construction of certain constitutional and statutory provisions relating to the debt limitations of school
districts in this 8tate. Upon petition the Attorney Gene-
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ral was granted leave to appear and file this brief. We
accept plaintiff's Statement of Facts.
We sought leaveto appear herein for the reason that
this case involves consideration of the constitutional
debt limit of school districts and other political subdivisions under Article XIV, Section 4 of the Utah Constitution. Also, there is pending before the District Court
of Sanpete County, case No. 4203 civil, The State of
Utah by and through its Treasurer, plaintiff, v. Spring
City, a municipal corporation, et al., in which the plaintiff
bondholder seeks recovery on a bond issue repudiated by
defendant. One of the issues in that case is whether for
the purpose of cmnputing the debt limitation of Spring
City the assessed valuation, or some other figure ascertained therefrom, is to be used under the provisions of
Article XIV, Section 4, Utah Constitution. We believe
the decision of this case will be determinative of that
constitutional issue in the case pending before the district
court in Sanpete County.
Plaintiff states in its brief that while it does not
contend that Section 80-5-1, UCA 1943, as amended by
Chapter 102, Laws of Utah 1947, is unconstitutional "it
may nevertheless be unconstitutional." (Plaintiff's brief,
page 17.) Defendant in his brief contends that Section
75-13-12, UCA 1943, as amended by Chapter 84, Laws of
Utah 1951, is unconstitutional. We believe the validity
of the proposed bonds, the only issue in this case, can be
determined by this court without specifically ruling upon
the constitutionality of. either statute.
4
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Until a1nended in 19-!7, Section 80-5-1, UCA 1943
provided that all .. taxable property must be assessed
at its full cash value.'' It is a matter of common knowledge that property was not assessed at full cash value but
was assessed at only some percentage thereof. The Legislature recognized this and in 1947 amended the statute
to provide that .. all taxable property must be assessed at
forty per cent of its reasonable fair cash value." We believe that by this amendment the Legislature intended
to indicate its approval of the practice which had been
followed for n1any years. In the Ninth Biennial Report
of the Tax Comn1ission of Utah for the years 1947-1948,
pp. 31-32 (3 Public Documents, 1946-1948), appears the
following:
"We come now to a more detailed consideration of activities of this commission with regard
to the property tax. Two years ago, the legislature, following constitutional amendments approved by vote of the people, enacted a series of
statutes to require all property to be assessed
at '40 per cent of its reasonable fair cash value.'
Another series of statutes was directed toward
more complete equalization of property values
throughout the state.
"In order to fulfill its obligations in this matter, the state tax commission has conducted studies of valuations in each county of the state and
has conferred with county taxing officials in an
atten1pt to work out plan~ for more complete
equalization. It appearPd that the first essential
step in this process was to detern1ine just what the
legislature 1neant by the term 'reasonable fair
<·ash value.' No defjnition wa~ given in any of the
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laws pas~ed by the legislature, so the commission
and the various county assessors faced the issue
of attempting to decide just how this term should
be construed and applied.
"The commission discussed the problem with
members of the legislature as well as with county
assessors and county boards of equalization. It
appeared that the legislature was attempting to
avoid the difficulties of erratic and high, currently
inflated prices and that an attempt was being
made to provide for a valuation which would not
be based upon inflated values; or upon depreciated values, either. With this in mind, the tax
commission concluded that the basic value under
the new statute should be set at some point between these two extremes.
"In view of the fact that all buildings in the
state had been carefully appraised upon the basis
of 1932 construction costs, a large segment of
property in the state was provided which was
uniformly assessed and which, it appeared, furnished a sound foundation for developing a basis
for uniform valuation of other classes of property. Construction costs were very low in 1932,
and increased rather consistently up to 1940.
After 1940, they skyrocketed in a very abrupt manner. It appeared that if the 1940 costs of buildings should be used as a basis for valuation, this
would be reasonable fair cash value of the property, as provided by law. * * *

a

"The cmnmission discussed this matter with
members of the legislature, with county assessor~
and county comrnissioners. At a n1eeting in Salt
Lake City July 23, 1947, which was attended by
county assessors, county commi~::;~::;ioners and members of. the state tax commission, it was unani6
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nwusly voted to appraise buildings on the basis
of the 1940 cosh.- and to relate the valuation of all
other classes of property as nearly as possible to
this valuation basis."
Frmn the foregoing it will be seen that property is
being assessed on the basis of forty per cent of 1940
cost. We submit that this court may take judicial notice
of the fact that 1940 cost is lower than 1951 full cash
value or Inarket value. It will be remembered that the
bond issue was voted in June of 1951 and therefore the
assessed value as of January 1, 1951, was the last assessment for state and county purposes.
The word "value" as used in Sections 2 and 3 of
Article XIII and in Section 4 of Article XIV, Utah Constitution, we think, means full cash value or market value.
It is our position that under Article XIII, the assessment
of property should be based upon full cash value or market value, and that under Article XIV, Section 4, the
constitutional debt limit of cities, towns, school districts,
and other 1nunicipalities is four per cent of the market
value of the taxable property involved in the particular
political subdivision.
It has been pointed out in plaintiff's brief, page 5,
that the assess.ed valrtte of the taxable property in Rich
County School District is $2,870,761.00 as determined
by the 1951 assess1nent. Two and one-half times this
figure gives the reasonable fair cash value as interpreted
by thP Tax Commis~ion, which repre~Pnts $7,176,902.50,
the reasonable fair cash value of the property in the Rich
County Nchool District based upon 1940 cost. Four per

7
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cent of $7,176,902.50 is $287,076.10. The total debt of
Rich County School District including the proposed $185,000.00 bond issue in controversy would amount to $271,400.00. Assuming this bond issue were made in the year
1940, it is clear that the total indebtedness of Rich County
School District would be less than the total permissible
bonded indebtedness for that year under Article XIV,
Section 4 of the Constitution. In view of the fact that
values have increased from 1940 to 1951, a fact of which
we think this court can take judicial notice, it is unnecessary in this case to determine the constitutionality of
Section 80-5-1, as amended in 1947.
As alleged in paragraph VII of the Complaint, plaintiff is under an immediate and pressing need for the
money represented by the bond issue. Other school
districts will also be vitally affected by the decision in
this case.

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I
THE WORD "VALUE" AS USED IN SECTIONS 2 AND
3, ARTICLE XIII AND SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH
CONSTITUTION, MEANS MARKET VALUE.

POINT II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT ESTABLISHED
BY SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH CONSTITUTION IS
NOT FOUR PER CENT OF ASSESSED VALUE.

8
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POINT III
IT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EITHER SECTION 80-5-1,
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 75-13-12, AS AMENDED.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE WORD "VALUE" AS USED IN SECTIONS 2 AND
3, ARTICLE XIII AND SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH
CONSTITUTION, MEANS MARKET VALUE.

Plaintiff contends that the word "value" as used in
the Constitution means ''reasonable fair cash value."
Plaintiff also contends that the constitutional debt limit
established by Article XIV, Section 4 of the Constitution is not four per cent of assessed value but is four per
cent of "full cash value." Apparently, plaintiff proceeds
on the theory that "full cash value" and "reasonable fair
cash value" are the smne. It is our opinion that the word
"value" as used in Section 4 of Article XIV, and in
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII, means market value.
It appears that this court in the case of State ex rel.
Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah 86, 50 Pac. 615, regarded
"market value" and "full cash value" as being synonymous. In that case, the court construed Sections 2 and
3 of Article XIII of the Constitution and in doing used
the following language :
"11 he provisions of the con~titution, so far as
1naterial to the decision of this case, are as fol-

9
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lows : In section 2 of article 13 it is provided that
'all property in the state, not exempt under the
laws of the United States, or under this constitution, shall be taxed in proportion to its value,
to be ascertained as provided by law.' Under this
provision all taxable property rnust be assessed
and taxed 'in proportion to its value.' It will be
noticed that 'value' is here referred to in a comparative manner, and is to be 'ascertained as provided by law.' The word 'proportion' doubtless
has reference to sameness or likeness in value of
property; that is, all property must be taxed at
the same relative value. If this provision were to
be considered by itself, it rnight be contended with
some force that the legislature had power to provide that all property should be assessed at a basis
less than its full value, and this might still be
considered as 'in proportion to its value.' The real
intent, however, of the framers of the constitution, is made more manifest in section 3 of article
13, which contains this language: 'The legislature
shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation on all property in the
state, according to its value in rnoney, and shall
prescribe by general law such regulations as shall
secure a just valuation for taxation of all property; so that every person and corporation shall
pay a tax in proportion to the value of his, her,
or its property.' This provision is closely related
to the one in section 2, and directs the legislature
not only to provide a uniform and equal rate of
assessment and taxation, so that every subject
owning property shall pay the same rate of tax
as every other such subject, but also declares that
all property shall be assessed· at a basis which
shall be 'according to its Yalue in money.' It i~
evident that the term 'according to its value in
10

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

nwney' 1neans that all property shall be valued,
for the purposes of assess1nent, as near as is
reasonably practicable, at its full cash value; in
other words, that the valuation for assessment
and taxation shall be, as near as reasonably practicable, equal to the cash price for which the property Yalued would :sell in open market, for this is
doubtles:s the correct test of the value of property.
The 1nanifest intention is that all taxable property
shall bear its just proportion of the burdens of
taxation. These two sections of the constitution
harmonize with each other ; and, by reading and
considering them together, it becomes clear that
all taxable property within this state must be
assessed and taxed on a valuation fixed at its
actual ca:sh value, or as near such value as is reasonably practicable."
As we read the foregoing case, property n1ust be
assessed and taxed on the basis of its market value. We
think decision in the Thomas case does not prohibit the
Legislature from providing that the assessment of property may be some percentage of market value or actual
cash value. The gist of the decision is that the assessment must be based upon market value. If the assessment is a percentage of market value, it is based on
market value.
We think it follows that when the framers of the constitution provided in Section -± of Article XIV that the
debt limit of certain political subdivisions should be
''four percentum of the value of the taxable property
therein, the value to be ascertained by the last assessment for state and county purposes," they intended that
11
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the debt limit should be four per cent of market value.
If the word "value" as used in Section 4 of Article XIV
is so construed, there is complete harmony in the constitutional provisions relating to the assessment and taxation of property and the limit of indebtedness of counties, cities, towns and school districts.

POINT II
THE CONSTITUTIONAL DEBT LIMIT ESTABLISHED
BY SECTION 4, ARTICLE XIV, UTAH CONSTITUTION IS
NOT FOUR PER CENT OF ASSESSED VALUE.

Article XIV, Section 4, of the Utah Constitution, so
far as material, provides:
"* * * no city, town, school district or other
municipal corporation, shall become indebted to
an amount, including existing indebtedness, exceeding four per centum of the value of the taxable property therein, the value to be ascertained
by the last assessment for State and County purposes, previous to the incurring of such indebtedness** *. (Italics added)
Cases construing the phrase italicized above are cited by
plaintiff and defendant. We believe the better reasoning
is found in the case of N. W. Halsey & Co. v. The City
of Belle Plains et al., 104 NW 494 ; 128 Iowa 467, and
IIansen v. City of IIoquiam et al., 163 P. 391, 95 Wash.
132. We quote from the opinion of the Washington Supreme Court :

12
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"It seen1s to us that the constitutional limit
upon n1unicipal indebtedness does not 1nean that
such debt lilnit is determinable by taking 5 per
cent of the assessed v~lue as detennined by the
assessing officers for taxation purposes when such
Yalue is by such officers the1nselves, in pursuance
of law and as a n1atter of faet, determined by taking a certain percentage of the actual value. Such
process of arriYing at the assessed value necessarily involYes a deter1nination of the actual value
of the property. The words 'value of the taxable
property,' as used in the constitutional provision
above quoted, should we regard them apart from
the words 'to be ascertained by the last assessment,' in their natural sense and as commonly
understood would plainly n1ean 'actual value' or
'1narket value.' Certainly they would mean no less
value than thi~. Do the words 'to be ascertained
by that last assessn1ent' which follow qualify or
change this natural and connnonly understood
n1eaning? \Ve think not, in view of the fact that
no provision of the Constitution as we have seen,
requires property to be assessed at any particular measure of value, but only that it shall be
assessed at a uniform rate to the end that taxes
shall be in proportion to the value of the property
taxed. So, that, when we have a statute which requires the assessing officers to assess property
for taxation 'not to exceed 50 per cent of its true
and fair value in 1noney' and the assessing officers
do in fact assess it at 50 per cent of its true value,
then by a simple rule of arithmetic its real value
is as certainly ascertained by the assessment as
it it had actually been assessed at its real value.
If there were no statute in our state prescribing
that the assessed Yalue shall not exceed 50 per
cent of the true value, in the absence of a show-

i3
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ing that the assessing officers assessed the property at some percentage of its true value, it would
probably be presumed as a matter of law that the
assessed value was also the true value, and the
municipal debt limit so ascertained. But the conditions of both law and fact attending the making
of these asse·ssments plainly tell us that 'the value
of the taxable property' in the city in each of the
years in question was exactly twice the value
fixed by the assessing officers for taxation purposes. This we think is ascertaining the value 'by
the last assessment.' The Constitution does not
say that the assessed value shall be the value for
the purposes of n1easuring the debt limit of municipalities. Indeed there seems to have been deliberate intention on the part of the Constitution
framers to avoid saying so, in view of the fact
that there is no constitutional requirement that
property shall be assessed at its full value for
taxation. • • •"
The opposite view expressed by the Supreme Court
of Illinois in the case of City of Chicago et al. v. Fishburn, 59 NE 791; 189 Ill. 367, we believe is not well reasoned. It will be noted that the Fishburn case was decided prior to the Hansen and the N. W. Halsey & Co.
cases, and that the courts in these latter cases took cognizance of the Fishburn case but repudiated the rule as
therein set forth.
It should also be here noted that many constitutions, unlike that of Utah's, limit the indebtedness of their
political subdivisions to a percentage of the assessed
valuation. Several of the cases cited by defendant arise
14
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under ~uch constitutional or statutory provision and for
this reason, we believe, are not in point.
\Ye subn1it that the value which is "to be ascertained
by the last assess1nent" is not the assessed value but is
the full1narket value upon which the assessed value Inust
be based.

POINT III
IT IS UNNECESSARY IN THIS CASE TO DETERMINE
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF EITHER SECTION 80-5-1,
AS AMENDED, OR SECTION 75-13-12, AS AMENDED.

In our Statement of Facts, we noted that prior to
its amendinent in 1947, Section 80-5-1 provided that all
''taxable property must be assessed at its full cash value."
This statutory provision was in harmony with the interpretation of Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII by this
court in the Thomas case. vVhen the legislature in 1947
amended the statute to provide that "all taxable property
must be assessed at forty per cent of its reasonable fair
cash value," it was giving its approval to the practice
that had been in vogue for Inany years, namely the assessment of property at only a percentage of its value.
The language hereinabove quoted in the Ninth Biennial
Report of the Tax Comrnission shows that the commis~ion has interpreted the words "reasonable fair cash
value" a~ meaning 1940 costs. rrwo possible objection~
could be raised to Section 80-5-1: 1-That it is unconstitutional because it provides for the assessment of prop-

15
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erty upon son1e basis other than Inarket value, namely,
reasonable fair cash value; 2-that it is unconstitutional
because it provides for the assessment of property on
a percentage of value rather than upon the full value.
We think it is unnecessary to determine eithe-r of
these questions because this court can t~ke judicial notice of the fact that the 1951 market value of the taxable
property in question is more than the 1940 cost of such
property. Afton Livestock Co. et al. v. Peterson et al.,
220 P. 710; 62 U. 437. Inasmuch as the proposed bond
issue comes within the constitutional debt limit if the
lower figure (reasonable fair cash value) is used, it necessarily follows that the bond issue is well within four
per cent of 1951 market value.
As to the second possible objection to the constitutionality of Section 80-5-1, it is sufficient to point out,
as we have previously noted, that if the assessment is
a percentage of full value, the assessment actually is
based upon full value. If the assessment is a percentage
of full value, full value may be easily ascertained by
a simple arithmetical computation.

CONCLUSION
The record before the Court in this case is inadequate for either a proper briefing of, or a ruling upon,
the question of the constitutionality of either Section 805-1 or Section 75-13-12. On the facts before this court,
16
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however, we submit that there is no question as to the
invalidity of the proposed bond issue. Regardless of
whatever infir1nities might be found in Section 80-5-1,
as amended, there are sufficient facts before this court to
conclude that the proposed bond issue is well within the
constitutional debt limit of the Rich County School District. Even if it should be argued that Section 75-13-12
provides a statutory debt limit for school districts, lower
than the constitutional debt li1nit, the proposed bond issue
is within such statutory debt limit.
\Ve submit, therefore, that regardless of the constitutionality of either Section 80-5-1 or 75-13-12, the
proposed bond issue is valid and the Clerk of the
school board should be required· to sign the bonds.
Respectfully submitted,
CLINTON D. VERNON
Attorney General

J. LA~fBERT GIBSON
Deputy Attorney General
ALLEN B. SORENSEN
Asst. Attorney General
G. I-IAL TAYLOR
Asst. Attorney General
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